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Memo- Suggested Reading For Work Session " . . 'Memorandum ." . To: 8/17/00 Re: Suggested Reading for Work Session At the start of our section on Police Department organization I plan to review the various models of law enforcement. The attached articles by James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling are generally regarded as the starting point ofthe community- policing model of law enforcement in the United States when they were published in The Atlantic Monthly in 1982. Although not necessary for our discussion, I thought if you have not had previous exposure to their writing it may help to understand the basics of the new model. I have included both articles published originally on the topic of community based policing so you can read tluough them prior to our discussion. . Thank-you. . .:1" MAR<;:H 19l12 THE ATLA.NTI, :'I10NTHLY PAGE 29 The police and neighborhood safety BROKEN WINDOWS BY JAMES Q. WILSON AND GEORGE L. KEUJNG I N THE MID-1970S, THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY AN- nounced a "Safe and Clean Neighborhoods Program,~ designed to improve the quality of community life in twenty-eight cities. As part of that program, the state pro- vided money to help cities take police officers out of their patrol cars and assign them to walking beats. The gover- nor and other state officials were enthusiastic about using foot patrol as a way of cutting crime, but many police chiefs were skeptical. Foot patrol, in their eyes, had been pretty much discredited. It reduced the mobility of the p0- lice, who thus had difficulty responding to citizen calls for service, and it weakened headquarters control over patrol officers. Many police officers also disliked foot patrol, but for dif- ferent reasons: it was hard work, it kept them outside on cold, rainy nights, and it reduced their chances for making a "good pinch." [n some departments, assigning officers to foot patrol had been used as a form of punishment. And academic experts on policing doubted that foot patrol would have any impact on crime rates; it was, in the opin ion of most, little more than a sop to public opinion. But since the state Was paying for it, the local authorities were willing to go along. j Five years after the program started, the Police Foun- dation, in Washington, D.C., published an evaluation of the foot-patrol project. Based on its analysis of a carefully controlled experiment carried out chiefly in Newark, the foundation concluded, to the surprise of hardly anyone. that foot patrol had not reduced crime rates. But residents of the foot-patrolled neighborhoods seemed to feel more tics were right-foot patrol has no effect on crime; it mere- secure than ~rsons in other areas, tended to believe that ly fools the citizens into thinking that they are safer. But in crime had been reduced, and seemed to take fewer steps to our view, and in the view of the authors of the Police Foun- protect themselves from crime (staying- at home ">'lith the dation study (of whom Kelling was one), the citizens of doors locked, for example). Moreover, citizens in the foot- Newark were not fooled at all. They knew what the foot- patrol areas had a more favorable opinion of the police than patrol officers were doing, they knew it was different from did those living elsewhere. And officers walking beats had what motorized officers do, and they knew that having of- higher morale. greater job satisfaction. and a more favor- ficers walk beats did in fact make their neighborhoods able attitude toward citizens in their neighborhoods than safer. rlid officers assigned to patrol cars. But how can a neighborhood be "safer" when the crime These findings may be taken as evidence that the skep- rate has not gone down-in fact, may have gone up? Find- ing the answer requires first that we understand what James Q. Wil.8Q)1 i.! Sh.a.ttuek Professor of Gauernment at Ha~'G.rd most often frightens people in public places. Many citizens, and autJwr of Thinking Alxlut Crime. Gearge L. Kelling, formerly of course, are primarily frightened by crime, especially directm" of t~ evaluation field staff of the Pollee Fm,aulation, [_~ CU7- crime involving a sudden, violent attack by a stranger. rnltlya ITsearr:hfellowat the John F Kennedy School of Government This risk is very real, in Newark as in many large cities. at HanIQrn, But we tend to overlook 'or forget another source of fear- 'LLUSTRATlONS BY SEYMOUR CHWAST -------- . THE A T L A ~. T I L ~I 0 S T H L \' MARCH 198Z ~ ~ the fear of being bothered by disorderly people. Not \'io- made up of "regulars" and "strangers." Regulars included lent people, nor, necessarily, criminals, but disreputable or both "decent folk" and some drunks and derelicts who were obstreperous or unpredictable people: panhandlers, always there but who "knew their place." Strangers were, drunks, addicts, ro'Vdy teenagers, prostitutes, loiterers, well, strangers, and viewed suspiciously, sometimes ap- the mentally disturbed. prehensively. The officer-eall him Kelly-knew who the What foot-patrol officers did was to elevate, to the ex- regulars were, and they knew him. As he saw his job, he tent they could, the level of public order in these neighbor- was to keep an eye on strangers, and make certain that the hoods. Though the neighborhoods were predominantly disreputable regulars observed some informal but widely black and the foot patrolmen were mostly white, this "or- understood rules. Drunks and addicts could sit on the cler-maintenance" function of the police was performed to stoops, but could not lie down. People could drink on side the general satisfaction of both parties. streets, but not at the main intersection. Bottles had to be One of us (Kelling) spent many hours walking with ~ ew in paper bags. Talking to, bothering, or begging from ark foot-patrol officers to see how they defined "order" and people waiting at the bus stop was strictly forbidden. If a what they did to maintain it. One beat was typical: a busy dispute erupted between a businessman and a customer, but dilapidated area in the heart of Newark, with many the businessman was assumed to be right, especially if the abandoned bUildings, marginal shops (several of which customer was a stranger. If a stranger loitered, Kelly prominently displayed knives and straight-edged razors in would ask him if he had any means of support and what his their windows), one large department store, and, most im- business was; if he gave unsatisfactory answers, he was portant, a train station and several major bus stops. sent on his way. Persons who broke the informal rules, es- Though the area was run down, its streets were filled with pecially those who bothered people waiting at bus stops, people. because it was a major transportation center. The were arrested for vagrancy. Noisy teenagers were told to good order of this area was important not only to those keep quiet. who li\'ed and worked there but also to many others. who These rules were defined and enforced in collaboration had to mow through it on their way home, to supermar- with the "regulars" on the street. Another neighborhood ket,.:, or to factol'ies. might have different rules, but these, ewr:,body under- The people on the street were primarily black: the offi- stood, were the rulE'S for tlm neighborhood. If someone (:E'r \\ho \\ alked the street \\as white. The people \\ ere \'iulated them. the regulars not only turned to Kl:'ll,\ fur . MARCH 1982 THE ATLA~,TIC ~O:-<THLY PAGE 31 . help but also ridiculed the violator. Sometimes what Kelly themseh'es law-abiding. Because of the nature of commu- did could be described a,; "enforcing the law,. but just as nity life in the Bronx-its anonymity, the frequency with often it involved taking informal or extralegal steps to help which cars are abandoned and things are stolen or broken. protect what the neighborhood had decided was the appro- the past experience of "no one caring" -vandalism begins priate level of public order. Some of thf' things he did prob- much more quickly than it does in staid Palo Alto, where ably would not withstand a legal challenge. people have come to believe that private possessions are A determined skeptic might acknowledge that a skilled cared for, and that mischievous behavior is costl,}: But \'an- foot-patrol officer can maintain order but still insist that dalism can occur anywhere once communal barriers-the this sort of "on:lerN has little to do with the real sources of sense of mutual regard and the obligations of civility-are community fear-that is, with violent crime. To a degree. lowered by actions that seem to signal that "no one cares." that is true. But two thin!{S must be borne in mind. First, We suggest that "untended" behavior also leads to the outside observers should not assume that they know how breakdown of community controls. A stable neighborhood much of the anxiety now endemic in many big-city neigh- of families who care for their homes, mind each other's chil- borhoods stems from a fear of "realN crime and how much dren, and confidently frown on unwanted intruders can from a sense that the street is dison:Jerly, a source of dis- change, in a few years or even a few months, to an inhospi- tasteful, worrisome encounters. The people of Newark, to judge from their behavior and their remarks to interview- ers, apparently assign a high value to public order, and feel relieved and reassured when the police help them maintain that orner. S ECO'D, AT THE COMMU'ITY LeVEL, DISORDeR AND crime are usually inextricably linked, in a kind of de- 8 velopmental sequence. Social psychologists and po- . lice officers tend to agree that if a window in a building is broken and is (eft lit/repaired. all the rest of the windows 00 ....,11 soon be broken. This is as true in nice neighborhoods as in run-down ones. Window~breaking does not necessar- ily occur on a large scale because some areas are inhabited by determined v..indow-breakers whereas others are popu- lated by y,indow-Io'l€rs: rather, one unrepaired broken window is a signal that no one cares, and so breaking more windows costs nothing. (l t has always been fun.) Philip Zimbardo, a Stanforn psychologist, reported in 1969 on some experiments testing the broken-window the- ory. He arranged to have an automobile without license plates parked with its hood up on a street in the Bronx and a comparable automobile on a street in Palo Alto, Califor- I nia. The car in the Bronx was attacked by "\'andals" within ten minutes of its "abandonment." The first to arrive were I a family-father, mother, and young son-who removed the radiator and battery, Within twent~dour hours, virtu- ally everything of value had been removed. Then random destruction began-windows were smashed, parts torn off', upholstery ripped. Children began to use the car as a playground. Most of the adult "vandals. were well- dressed. apparently clean-cut whites, The car in Palo Alto sat unto\J.chf'd for more than a week. Then Zimbardo smashed part of it with a sledgehammer. Soon. passersby were joining in. Within a few hours, the car had been . turned upside down and utterly destro:\:ed, Ag-ain. thl:' "vamlal,;" appeared to be primaril,\' respectable whites. ! Cntended pro pert.'. becomes fair game for people out fOf fun Of plunder. and e'.en flJr pt'ople who ordinarily wou Ii! not dream of doing ,;urh things and who probabl~. conSider - ~I PAGE :n THE ATLA~T[C ~ONTHLY MARCH 1982 with averted eyes, silent lips, and hurried steps. "Don't get involved." For some residents, this growing atomiza- tion .....ill matter little, because the neighborhood is not their ~home" but "the place where they live," Their inter- ests are elsewhere; they are cosmopolitans. But it will matter gTeatly to other people, whose lives deri\'e mean- ing and satisfaction from local attachments rather than worldly involvement; for them, the neighborhood will cease to exist except for a few reliable friends whom they arrange to meet. Such an area is vulnerable to criminal invasion. Though it is not inevitable, it is more likely that here, rather than in places where people are confident they can regulate public behavior by informal controls, drugs will change hands, prostitutes will solicit, and cars will be stripped. That the drunks will be robbed by boys who do it as a lark, and the prostitutes' customers will be robbed by men who do it purposefully and perhaps violently. That mug~ngs will occur. Among those who often find it difficult to move away from this are the elderly. Surveys of citizens suggest that the elderly are much less likely to be the victims of crime than younger persons. and some have inferred from this that the well-known fear of crime voiced by the elderly is an exaggeration: perhaps we ought not to design special programs to protect older persons; perhaps we should even try to talk them out of their mistaken fears. This ar- gument misses the point. The prospect of a confrontation with an obstreperous teenager or a drunken panhandler can be as fear-inducing for defenseless persons as the pros- pect of meeting an actual robber; indeed, to a defenseless person, the two kinds of confrontation are often indistin- guishable. Moreover, the lower rate at which the elderly are victimized is a measure of the steps they have already taken---chiefly, staying behind locked doors---to minimize the risks they face. Young men are more frequently at- tacked than older women, not because they are easier or more lucrative targets but because they are on the streets more. Nor is the connection between disorderliness and fear table and frightening jungle, A piece of property is aban- made only by the elderly. Susan Estrich, of the Harvard doned, weeds grow up, a window is smashed. Adults stop Law School, has recently gathered together a number of scolding rowely children: the children, emboldened, be- surveys on the sources of public fear. One, done in Port- come more rowdy. Families move out, unattached adults land, Oregon, indicated that three fourths of the adults in- move in, Teenagers gather in front of the corner store. The terviewed cross to the other side of a street when they see merchant asks them to move: they refuse. Fights occur. a gang of teenagers; another survey, in Baltimore, disco\'- Litter accumulates. People start drinking in front of the ered that nearly half would cross the street to avoid even a grocery; in time, an inebriate slumps to the sidewalk and is single strange youth. When an interviewer asked people in allowed to sleep it off. Pedestrians are approached by a housing project where the most dangerous spot was. panhandlers. they mentioned a place where young persons gathereo to At this point It is not inevitable that serious crime will drink and play music, despite the fact that not a single flourish or violent attacks on "trangers will occur. But crime had occurred there. In Boston public housing- proj- many residents will think that crime, especially violent ects, the ~atest fear was expressed by person;: living in crime, IS on the ri"e. and they wil] modify their behavior the buildings where disorderliness and inci\'ilit~'. not ac('ordingJ~'. They \\ tli u"e the ;:treets le:;s often. and when cnme, ,\'ere the greatest. Knowing this helps one undf'r- on the :,treets will stay apart f!"Um their fellows. mo\'ing stano the significance of su'ch otherwise harm]e:-::, rli:,pla,\'" '~ ~ARCH 1~,'2 THE A T L A :-.; TIC ~I 0 :-.; T H L \. PAGE :~l . <I~ ~uiJway grattiti, .\,~ .'\<lth;lIl (;Iazt'r ha" \Hlttt'n. tht' IJ I'll , agf'ncif's and paid a regular salary; simultant'ously, tht' ['t'- !ifl:'ratlull of gTattiti. t'\,{,ll \1 ht'11 n<lt 'Jb,~cE'Ilf'. CUll fru 11 t.' the sponsihility rur prose('utin!l thieves was shifted from the subll<l,\' rull'r \1 lth thl:' "inf'~capabll' knl)\\'lt'dl!'l' that tfw ,'11- aggTif'\,t'd )Jrl\'ate cit izen to the professional pl"<J,;ecU[()I', \'il'Ollment ht' mu,;t endure fur an hlJur 'Jr mort' a day j" ThiS proce,;s wa.:; not cumplete in most pJacf's until thE' ,I uneuntr,dlt'd and unculltl'OlIabll:', and that anyOlW l'all in- l wentieth l'l:'ntury. \'(j(le it tl) dl! \\'hate\'t'r darnagl' and mischief the fI1lJld In the l%U", when urban riots Wtore a major prublt'm, 1 suggt':<t,;, " social scientists began to explore carefully the unler-main- I In rt'''poll,;t' tu fl:'ar, pl:'upll:' a\'uid one anotht'r. II t'akt'lling tenance function of the police, and to suggest wa,\''; of im- contf"Uls. c)ometimes they ('all the police, Patrol car" a!'- pro\'ing it not to make :;treets safer (its original functioll) rive. an i)l'l:a:<ional an't',;t uccurs, but crime continue,; and but to reduce the incidence of mass violence. Order-main- I di"order i" not abated. Citizen" complain to the police tenance became, to a degree. coterminuu:, with '"commu- l chief. but he e:\.plain" that his defJartment is luw on J1er:<on' nity relations," But, as the crime wave that began in the nel and that the COUI.t:; do not puni"h petty or fir"[-time early l%Os l'ontinued without abatement throughout the offenders. To the residents. the pulice who arri\'e in ,.;quad decade and into the 19705. attention shifted to the role of cars are either ineffective (}I' uncaring; to the police, the the police as crime-fighters, Studies of police beha\'ior residents are animals who de,.;en'e each other. The cItizens ceased. by and large. to be accounts of the order-maillte~ I may soun stop calling- the police. because '"they can't do nance function and became, instead, efforts to propose and anything. " test ways whereby the police could ,;oIve more crimes, The proce,.;s we ('all urban dt'cay ha" occurred fur ('entur- make more arrests, and gather better evidence, [f the,.;e ies in every city, But what is happening- toda.\I is different things could be done. social scientists a..~sumed. citizen,.; in at least two important res pe('t:; , First. in thl:' period be- would be less fearful. fore, ,;a~'. World War [1. city dwdlers-becau,.;e of mOlH,'.\ costs, transportation difticultit':<. familia! and church con- nectiull,.;--could rart'l~' mO\'e away from neighborhood problems, \Vht'n muvement (lid O('l'ur. it tended to be alung pubJic-tran,.;it route:" .\" uw mubility ha:' become eXt'eption- . ally ea,;~' fur all but the poore,;t 01' t hu,;e \Iho an' blu('K('d by racial prejudice, Earlier criml:' \\a\,,',; had <\ kind of built-in ,;dr~l'O!Tl:'ClIng mC'chani"m: the detenllinaw)tl of a neighborhuod or ('ommunity to 1'I.:,;J,;';l:'rt cuntrol u\'er it,; turf. Art'a,; in Chicago. :\l:'\1 York, and Roston \HJUld ex perienc(' crime and gang \\'<\1'';, and tht'n nOl'malc.\' would rf'turn . as the fa,nilies for whom no altel'nall\ e rC':-,I- denl'es were po,;sible reclaimed their authority o\'er th(" strl't'b, Second. the poliee III thi" t'arhl:'l' period a,;"i,;ted in that l'eas,;ertion of authorit:. h~' ading, :.;umdiml',; \'iult'ntlv, 1)f1 behalf of the l'ommunity, Young- tou~h,; WE're roughed up, people were arl'e:<ted "on :,u,;pil'ion .. ur fur \'agraJlcy. and pro,;titute,; and pett~- thie\'es \\'ere router!. "Right,; .. IH're something enjoyed hy decent folk. and perhaps al:<o b~' t Iw ,;eriou,; profl:'S';llJllal criminal. who ;l\'"ided nulelll'e and c<luld atlonl a 1<1\\ yer, Thi" pattl:'rn uf puJi,'in,l!: 1\ a,; not an aberrati')ll or th(. rl:'sult of ucca,;ional E'xce,;:<, From the earlit,,;t da~',; of thi' nal lOr!, the pullee functiun was seen primarily as that of a night watchman: to maintain ,mler agaln,;t the chid threat,.; to Ol1ler-fire. wild animal:<, and di:<reputablt' be- ha \'ior, Suh'ing crime,; Il'as \'Ie\\e<l Il"t a;-: a puli('e l'l',;p,m"i bilit~, but as a pril'ate une, In thl' \Iarch. l~li~, Allu,ilu-, une of u:< I \\'il,;on I \ITote a hnt'f aL'("Jllllt of ho\\' t he polin' roll:' had ,;I'nd,I' ('han~ed f!"ilm m,(int<lllllllg 'Jl1Il:'r tll li~htll1l(' . l'rinw,; Thl> ch,lll,l[e be!!an \1 lth the l'reaUon IIr pri\'<Itl. d,'- te('tl\l'~ l"rt"!J t':\~l-rillllna],,', \\ h" \\ IIrked 1111 a "l)nUIl- w'nl',\'-ft.(" ha,~i~ f'Jr indl\'idual,; \I'h,) had "Ut'ki'l>d ]"""'-, III [Jllll'. th,. 11f'[t'dil,'" \\f'I'i:' ;111""1'111:11 1!IlII mUIlIt'I!Jd] I",]\t:l' ~ . - PAGE :J.1 THE A T LAS T I L' :'1 0 S T H L \' MARCH 1~~2 A cRE....r DEAL W.b .-I.(Cm[I'LI;';HED Dl'Rl;-";C THl;'; harrier. He cannot be certain what i,; being said, nor can hI' tran,;ition. as both police chiefs and out:'lde t'.\ join in and, by displaying his o\\'n ,;kill at street banter. pert,; emfJha.~ized the crime,tightmg function in prove that he cannot be "put down. n In the process. the their plans. in the allocatiun of rC';OUl"ce". and in deplo~'- officer ha,; learned almost nothing, and the boys have de ment 1)( personnel. The police may WE'll ha\'E' become bet- dded the offit:er is an alien force who can safely be disre- tel' cnme-tighters a,; a re,;ult. And doubtless the,\' re- ganled. e\'en mocked. mained aware of their respon,;ibiJity for orrler. But the link Our experience is that most citizens like to talk to a po- between on:ler-maintenance and crime-pre\'entlOn. ';0 ob lice officer, Such exchanges give them a sense of impur- viou,; to earlier generations. was forgotten, tance, pro\'ide them with the basis for gossip, and allow That link i,; similar to the process whereby one broken them to explain to the authorities what is worrying them window becomes many, The citizen who fears the ill-smell- (whereby they gain a modest but significant sense of hav- ing drunk, the rowdy teenag-er. or the importuning beg-gar ing "done something" about the problem). You approach a is not merely expressing- his distaste for unseemly behav- person on foot more easily, and talk to him more readily, ior: he is also gi\'ing voice to a bit of folk wisdom that hap- than you do a person in a car. Moreover, you can more pens to be a correct generalization-namely, that seriou~ easily retain some anonymity if you draw an officer aside street crime flourishes in areas in which disorderl~' behav- for a private chat. Suppose you want to pass on a tip about ior goes unchecked. The unchecked panhandler is, in ef- who is stealing handbags, or who offered to sell you a sto- fect, the first broken window. }luggers ann robbers. len TV. In the inner city, the culprit, in all likelihood, live~ whether opportunistic or professiona1. be/ie\'e they reduce nearby. To walk up to a marked patrol car and lean in the their chances of being caught or en'n identified if the~' op- v.indow is to convey a visible signal that you are a "fink." erate on streets where potential \'ictims are alread~' intimi- The essence of the police role in maintaining order is to dated by pre\'ailing conditions. [f t he neighborhood cannot reinforce the infonnal control mechanisms of the commu- keep a bothersome panhandler from annoying passersby. nity itself. The police cannot, without committing extraor the thief may reason. it is Hen le,;s likely to call the police dinary resources, provide a substitute for that infonnal to identify a potential mugger 01' to interfere if the mug- control. On the other hand, to reinforce those natural ging actually takes place. forces the police must accommodate them. And therein lies Some poliee administrator,; concede that this process oc- the problem, cur,;. but argue that motorized-patrol officers can neal \\'it h it as et'fecti\'el.\' as foot-patrol officer~, We are not so sure, In theory, an offieer in a squad car can obsen'e a,; mu('h as SHoveD rOLICE ACTIVITY ON TH E STREET BE SHAPED. an officer on foot: in theory, the former can talk to as many in important ways, by the standards of the neighbor people as the lartet-. But the reality of police--citizen en- hood rather than by the rules of the state? Over the counters is powerfully alterecl by the automobile, An offi- pa..~t two decades, the shift of police from order-mainte- cet' on foot cannot "eparate himself fl'om the ,;treet people; nance to law-enforcement has brought them increasingl~' if he is approached. only hi,; uniform and hi" personality under the influence of legal restrictions, provoked by me- can help him manage whaten'r is about to happen. Ami he dia c'omplaints and enforced by court decisions and depart- can ne\'er be certain what that will be-a request fordirec mental on:iers. As a consequence, the on:ier-maintenance tions. a plea for help. an angl'Y denunciat ion, a teasing re- functions of the police are now go\'erned by rules deyel- mark, a confused babble. a thrt'atening gesturE'. oped to control police relations '.vith suspected criminals. I n a car. an officer IS more likely to deal \\ ith stn:,t'l Thi,; is. we think, an entirely new development. For cen- people by rulllllg down the window and looking at them, turies, the role of the police a..'i watchmen was judged pri- The door and the \\'indol\' exdud!' the approaching citizen: marily not in terms of its compliance with appropriate pro- they are a barrier. Some officers take ad\'antalIE' of this cedures but rather in terms of its attaining a desired barrier. perhaps uncon"ciousj~'. by acting differently if in objective. The objective was on:ier, an inherently ambigu- the car than the~' would on foot. We han' ,;een this count- ous term but a condition that people in a given community less times, The police car pulls up to a comer where teen- recognized when they saw it. The means were the same as agers al'e gathered, The window is rolled do\\'n, The officer those the community itself would employ, if its members stares at the ~'outh:,. The~' stare back, The officer says to were ,;ufficiently determined, courageous, and authorita- one. -('merE'." He saunters o\"er. conI-eying to his hiends tive, Detecting ami aprrehending criminals, by contrast. by hi" elabOl'atel.v ca.sual style the idea that he is not Ill' was a means to an end, not an end in itself: a judicial deter- timidated b~' authorit~,. "What's your name',''' ~(huck." mination of guilt or innocence was the hoped-for result of "Chuck who'?" "C huck .J ont'.-:." "What \'a d'ling, Chuck"" thl:' law-enforcement mone. from the tlrst, the police were -;.;')thll1.... "<.;ot a PO. I parole "Hic("rl.'" ";';ah."' ":-iUl'l".''' expected to follow mIl'S denmng that proeess, thoug-h "Yeah." ""ta~' (jut <if tl'oublt', ('huCKt....." :\[l-am\htle, the state" differed in how :tnngent the rule~ should be. Tht' lit ht'r boys I,iugh al1t1 ,.'\dwlIgt, <:1IlT1llleiH ~ aflloni!" t ht'l11- cnmlnal-apprehen';lUn , mces,; \\"as al wa~'s uni!('r,;tooi! tn sd\es, I'r(jbabl\' at thp I)rtiel'r'.~ l'.\pt'nse. Tlw IIlhn'l" s(an'~ in\(Jh'i' indi\'idua; rights. the \-(olatio!l /}f \\'hich \\'as unaC'- MARCH 1%2 THE ATLA....TrC .'10:-;THLY PAGE .j.) . l:eptable becau:,e it meant that the \1.daung officer \lould the pojice do not become the agents of neighborhood be acting <1:' a judge and jury-and that \\a,..:. not hi:' jub, bigotry'~ Guilt or innocence \I'as to be dt'termined by Unl\'er,..:.al ,;tan We can offer no wholly satIsfacwry answer (0 this Impor- danis under special procedures, tant question. \Ve are not confident that there is a ,;atisfac- Ordinarily, no judge ur jury en'r .-;ees the persons caught tory answer, except to hope that by their selection. tl'ain~ up in a dispute o\"er the appropriate level of neighborhood ing, and supervision, the police will be inculcated with a order. That is true not only because most cases are handled clear sense of the outer limit of their discretionary author- informally on the street but also because no uni\'ersal stan- ity, That limit, roughly, is this-the police exist to help reg darrls are available to settle arguments on'r dis-order, and ulate behavior. not to maintain the racial or ethnic purit~. thu:i a judge may not be any wiser or more effective than a of a neighborhood, police officer. Cntil quite recently in many states. and even Consider the case of the Robert Taylor Homes in Chi- today in some places, the police make arrest.~ on such cago, one of the largest public-housing projects in the charges as "suspicious person" or "vagrancy" or "public country. It is home for nearly 20,000 people, all black, and drunkenness"--charges with ~caf{'ely any legal meaning. extends over ninety-two acres along South State Street. It These charges exist not because society wants judges to was named after a distinguished black who had bef'n, dur- punish vagrants or drunks but because it wants an officer ing the 1940s, chairman of the Chicago Housing Authority. to have the legal tools to remove undesirable persons horn Not long after it opened, in 1962, relations between proj- a neighborhood when infonnal efforts to preserve order in ect residents and the police deteriorated badly. The citi- the streets have failed, zens felt that the police were insensitive or brutal: the Once we begin to think of all aspects of police work as police, in turn, complained of unprovoked attacks on them, I involving the application of universal rules under special Some Chicago officers tell of times when they were afraid procedures, we inevitably a:ik what constitutes an "unoe- to enter the Homes. Crime rates soared. sirable person" and why we ,;hould "criminalize" \'a~ancy Today, the atmosphere has changed. Po]ice-citizen rela, I or drunkenness, A strong and commendable desire to see tions have improved-apparently, both sides learned '. that people are treated fairly makes us worry about allow- something from the earlier experience. Recently, a boy ing the police to rout persons whu are undesirable by some stole a purse and ran off. Several young persons who sal\ vague or parochial standard. A grU\l'ing and not-so-com- the theft voluntarily passed along to the police information menrlable utilitarianism leads us to doubt that any behay- on the identity and residence of the thief, and they (/ld this ior that does not "hurt" another per~;on ,;hould be made publicly, with friends and neighbors looking on. But pl"Ob illegal. And thus many of us who watch o\'er the police an! lems persist, chief among them the presencp of yuuth reluctant to allow them to perfoml. in the only way the.\' gangs that terrorize residents and recruit members in the can, a function thattewry neighborhood dpsperately wants project. The pe(,ple expect the police to "cio somethinR .. , them to perform. about this, and the police are determined to do ju,;t that. This wish to ~decriminalize" (li:ireputable beha\'ior that But do what'! Though the police can obviously make al'- "harms no one"-and thus remo\'e the ultimate sanction rests whenever a gang member breaks the law, a gang- call the pollce can employ to maintain neig-hborhood order-i,;. form, recruit, and congregate without breaking the la\\. we think, a mi,;take. An'estill~' a ,-;ingle drunk or a sin)!Je And only a tiny fraction of gang-related crimes ('an be vagrant who has harmed no identifiable person seem;; un- solved by an arrest: thus. if an arrest is the only recourse just, and in a sen"e it is< But failing to du anything about a for the police, the residents' fears Will go unas,;uaged, Tlw score of drunks or a hundred \'<I!lrants ma.\' dbtro~' an e!\~ pulice will suon feel helpless, and the resid~'nt:' \\ill a"ain t ire cornmunit~., A particular rule that seem,; to make believe that the police "do nothing." What the police In fad sen"e in the llllli\-idual case makes IlO ~t'nse when it i,.; do is to chase known gang members out of the project. [n [ made a uni\'ersall"ule and applied to allea.-;e:,. It make" no the words of one officer. "We kick ass." Project re,;irlents ,;ense becau:,e it filiI:< to take into al:count the connection both know and approve of this, The tacit pollce"",,-'itizen alli- between one hroken window left untended and a thousand ancc in the project is reinforced by the police \'iew that tht ~ broken wind\Jws. Of cour:ie, agencie,; uther than the police cops and the gangs are the two rival sourCes of power in could attend to the pl'Oblem,..:. posed hy drunk:i or the men~ the area, and that the gangs are not going to win. tall~- ill. but in mo:'t communitles----t::,;petiall,I' where the ~ one of this i., easily reconciled with any conteptlOIl o!" "dein"titutlonalization'. tllOH'ment has been :'trong-they clue pl'Ocess or fair treatment. Since both re,;irlents and do not, gang members are black, race i,; not a factor, But It ((Juld .. The concern abllut eq uit.\" I:' mort' s('rilJu~, \\-e miJlht be. :-3uppose a white project confronted a black g-ang. IJI' a~T(,p that Ct'l'taln lll'ha\ iur makt,~ IInl' p"l"~lIn mol'[' unlit' \'ice \'E'rsa, \Ve \\'ould be apprehenslH' abuut the pollce taK :\ ,;irablt-' than anothl'r. hut hlJ\1 illJ \\ I' t'n~lll'l' that a~l' III" Inil ~Ide:', But the sub"tanti\"e prohlem remain_, tht' :'a/11t': ~kil1 elll,)r Ill' lutiun,t! ')l'iJl"in III' h<ll'mll'~,": mannel'ism_..: \\ ill hUll can the police :'tl'!"llilthen the informal social-culltrul nol aIs,) 1Jl"'Ime tl1t' ba~l:' (\II' dl~tIn'o!UI~hllli.C thv und...",/'- nlt'l'hal1l.-:m" ,)1' natural commullltil''-: ill 'Inlp!, tu 111ll1imlZP ,[bll:' fr"m the dt'o'lt'able',' Hu\\' tI" \\"1' l'Il~llt-I'< ill ~h",'l. lhat fear ill public place,;',' La\\' enfurcement. pl'r ~l'. i~ IHI <lll- PAGE :l!j THE AT LA=- TIC ~I 0 =- T I: L Y MARCH 1982 ,';11 l'l", ,-\ ).!<ltl).." l',U] II "',lh"'ll Ill" d",,,t1,(J.I a l'\JlJlIl1Uni(,I' b.l' E\'t'lI in areao: that are in jeopardy from dison.lerly ele- ':[;!lIdln!.!' ,ihlJlJ[ III <l Illt'llal"lllL! (;I.-hil)ll alld ,';Pt';d'dlll-!' l'udt'ly men!,.;. cllizen action without ,.;ubstantial police in\"olve- t,) pa';';"'l',;b.\' ""thout hl't'ah'll.L!' tlw lall', mem may be ,.;ufficient. Meetings between teenagers who i1ke to hang out on a particular corner and adults who want to u,.;e that corner might well lead to an amicable agree- W" 'W'" P liT "TL 1Y Till""" ABOLT 'lOCH 'L>T, ment on a set of rules about how many people can be al- ter,;. Ilot ,:i!nply bt'cau,;e the ethical and lepd j,:- lowed to congregate, where. and when. ,:ue,.; al'e "u complex but becau,.;e I\'e hill'!:' be- Whf>re no understanding is possible-or if possible, not come an'u,.;wmed (0 thlllking- of the law in e,:",emiall,\' observed~itizen patrols may be a sufficient response. indil'iduali,.;tic term", Tht' lal\" detine" JII.iI!'ight,.;, puni:,hes There are two traditions of communal involvement in Ili,~ beha\'ior. and 1" applied by I/wl officer becau"e of Ihi8 maintaining order. One, that of the ~community watch- harm, We a,;,.;ume. ill thinkillg- thi" \\'a~', that what is good men, n is as old a.'i the first settlement of the New World. for the illdi\"iduai II'ill be ~wod for tile communit,\'. and what emil well into the nineteenth century, volunteer watch doe,.;n't matter \I'hen it hapPlo'ns to one per";OIl \\'on't matter men, not policemen, patrolled their communities to keep if it happen,.; [0 mall,\: OITlinal'ily. those are plausible <is- order. They did so, by and large, without taking the law sumption,.;. But in ca,;e" where beha\'ior that i:, tolerable to into their own hands-without, that is, punishing persons one pel'"on i,.; intolerable to many other,.;, the reaction", of or using force. Their presence deterred disorder or alerted the othel',.;-fear, \\'i t hdl"a 1\'aL flight-ma~' ultimately the community to dison.:ler that could not be deterred. make matter,.; WOI',;e for e\'el'yone. including the indi\'idual There are hundreds of such efforts today in communities \\'ho fir"t pl"Llft':,,.;ed hi" indifference. all across the nation. Perhaps the best known is that of the It ma,\' be their gTt'atel' ..;el1,.;iti\'i~,\' to commullal as op- GuanJian Angels, a group of unarmed young persons in ]HN'd [0 lndj\'jdua] need,.: that help" explain \\-h.\' the re"i- distinctive berets and T-shirts, who first came to public dpnt:' of ,.;mall L"ommunit it'':' are more ,.;au"fied with their attention when they began patrolling the New York City poliet. than are the n',.;iden~:, of "imilar neivhborhoo(J,.; in subways but who claim now to have chapters in more than big: ntie:" f:tinol' (bnum and ht'r co-workers at Indiana thirty American cities. Unfortunately, we have little infor- l' ni\'E'r,.:jty L'ompal'ed thl' perception of police ,:.enice,.; in mati on about the effect of these groups on crime. It is po:,- t\\O pont.. all-black lllilllli,; tOI\n,;-Phoenix and East Chi- "ible, however. that whatever their effect on crime, citi- eago Heig"hb-with tho,.;e ()f three comparable all-blark zen:; find their presence reassuring, and that they thus neighborhoods in C Imago, The le\'el of criminal \'ictimlza- contribute to maintaining a sense of order and civility. tiun and the quaJit,\' Df p()hL'e--commullit~. relation,.; ap The seconcl tradition is that of the wvigilante." Rarely a peared tu be about the ,.;ame in the town,.; and the Chicago feature of the settled communities of the East, it was pri neighborhood,.;, BUl)the citizen,.; li\'ing 111 thell' ,)I\-n \'ilJages marily to be found in those frontier towns that grew up in we!'e much more likel~' than tho,.;e li\'in!! in the Chical(o advance of the reach of go\'ernment. )fore than 350 vigi- neil?"hbol'hood,.; to "a,I' that t he,l' (10 not ..;ta,\' at home for fear lante groups are known to have existed; their distinctive of erime. to agTee that thl' local po!il'e have "the right to feature was that their members did take the law into their take an:: action nel'e,.;,:.ar,\' " tlJ deal \\ nil (ll'ohlems. and to 0\\'11 hands, by acting as judge, jury, and often executioner agTee that the poliet' "!o()k out fDl' lhl' need,.; of the average as well as policeman. Today, the vigilante movement i~ citizen," It is po,.;"ibl" that the l'e"idellt,.; and the police of conspicuous by its rarity, despite the great tear expressed i the ,;mall tOlln" ,.;al\" them,:eln',.: a,.: enga~ed in a ml!abora by citizens that the ol(ler cities are becoming "urban fran- i ti\'l' elJ(Jl.t to maintain ,1 l'f'l.tain "taIHlanl of communal life. tiers." But some community-watchmen groups ha\"e skirt- I\'herea" thlJ,;e of thl' big l.!tV fdt tht'm,.;eh b to be "impl.\' eel the line. and others may era,.;" it in the future, An am- reque"ting and ,;uppl,\'ing particular ,.;er\"lces on an individ- biguous case, reported m The Wall Street )olll/wi, ual ba,.;i", ill\'oh'ed a citizens' patrol in the Silver Lake area of Belle- If thi~ i,.; true, huw ,:.hould a \\-l,.:e policE' chief deploy hi,.; ville. ~ew Jersey. A leader told the reporter, "We look for meager forcp,.:",' The fil""t an"wel' is that nobody know,; for outsiders," If a few teenagers from outside the neighbor certain, and the mo,.;t fJ!"wlent l'our,.;e of aetion would be to hood enter it, "we ask them theil' business," he said. ~If try further I'ariation,,; ,m tht' :-\l'wark e:\perimem, to ~e<, they say they're going down the street to see Mrs, Jones, mol't' precj,.;\:,!y II hat \\"lJl'k" In Il'hat kim],.: of nelg"hbor fine, we let them pass. But then we follow them down the hood,.:, The "<,colld ,\11:'11"1.:'1' I" al":'J a hed)le-man,I' a"pect,.: block to make sure they're really going to see )frs, J one:'. " of unlt'l"-maimt'llanu' in nel,th horhuud,.: l'an pl'IJbabl,\' be,;t fl\' handler! in \Ia~':, that invllh'(' tht' pllliL"t' rnllllmall,I'. ,f at all. .\ Illl":.\", hu,;tlilll-!' ';/1OPPIlHt \.1.:'l1ter alld a qUIPt. II ell- THOl'GH CITIZE;\,S C.-\;\, DO.... GRE....T DEAL, THE POLlCE tt'IHled ,-uburh nla\ Ilt''''' ;dml',,[ Ill) \ 1"11.,1,, /,IJ!it"l, pl\'~t'nCl', are plainly the key to .order maintenanc~. Fill" ()W? III h'Jth \.'a':t~..'. tt1l' 1'~11l1J 'II' l"t':'lw\.'ublt' t" di:'l"l'pUt,lble thmg. man,\' ('ommullltle,.;. ,:.uch a,:. the Robert Tay- Pl'''ldt' I" "Pllll,lI'ih' ,'I) hiJ-"h ,I,'; to m.lKl' 1ll!'I)I'mal ~"l'I;\ll"l11- lor Honll'':', l'annut du the joh hy thE'm,.;el\"t~:'. for another, lI',,1 t'fft'rt 1 \'l', nu citizen in a n~ighbol"h()od. e\"en an IJ1"galllzed ont'o i,; like- PAGE .1' T H J:: .-\ T L .~ ,. T J C ~1 {) ;,; T 1I L Y MARCH lYH:! Iy to feel the sense of responsibility that wearing a badge cer likes the additional income, and the residents feel confers. Psychologists have done many .studies on why safer. Such arrangements are probably more successful people fail to go to the aid of persons being attacked or than hiring private watchmen, and the Newark experi- seeking help, and they have learned that the cause is not ment helps us understand why. A private security guanl "apathy" or "selfishness" but the absent:'e of some plausibJe may deter crime or misconduct by his presence, and he grounds for feeling that one must personally accept re- may go to the aid of persons needing help, but he may well sponsibility. Ironically, avoiding responsibility is easier not intervene------that is, control or drive away-someone when a lot of people are standing about. On streets and in challenging community standards. Being a sworn officer- public places, where order is so important. many people a "real cop"-seems to give one the confidence, the sense are likely to be "around," a fact that reduces the chance of of duty, and the aura of authority necessary to perform this anyone person acting as the agent of the community. The difficult task. police officer's uniform singles him out as a person who Patrol officers might be encouraged to go to and from must accept responsibility if asked. In addition, officers, duty stations on public transportation and, while on the more easily than their fellow citizens, can be expected to bus or subway car, enforce rules about smoking, drinking, distinguish between what is necessary to protect the safe- disorderly conduct, and the like. The enforcement need in- ty of the street and what merely protects its ethnic purity. volve nothing more than ejecting the offender (the offense, But the police forces of America are losing, not gaining, after all, is not one with which a booking officer or a judge members. Some cities have suffered substantial cuts in the \\ishes to be bothered). Pemaps the random but relentless number of officers available for duty. These cuts are not maintenance of standards on buses would lead to condi likely to be reversed in the near future. Therefore, each tions on buses that approximate the level of civility we department must assign its existing officers with great now take for granted on airplanes. care. Some neighborhoods are so demoralized and crime- But the most important requirement is to think that to ridden as to make foot patrol useless: the best the police maintain order in precarious situations is a vital job. The can do with limited resources is respond to the enormous police know this is one of their functions, and they also number of calls for :-iervice. Other neighborhoods are so believe, correctly, that it cannot be done to the exclusion of stable and serene as to make foot patrol unnecessary. The criminal investigation and responding to calls. We may key is to identify neighborhoods at the tipping point- have encouraged them to suppose, however, on the basis of where the public order is deteriorating but not unrerlaima- our oft-repeated concerns about serious, violent crime, ble, where the streets are used frequently but by appre- that they will be judged exclusively on their capacity as hensiYe people, where a window i:-i likel,\' to be broken at crime-fighters. To the extent that this is the case, police any time, and must quickly be fixed jf all al'e not to be administrators will continue to concentrate police person- shattered. nel in the highest-crime areas (though not necessarily in Most police d~partments do not have ways of systemati- the areas most vulnerable to criminal invasion), emphasize cally identifying such areas and assigning officers to them, their training in the law and criminal apprehension (and Officers al'e assigned on the basis uf crime rates (meaning not their training in managing street life), and join too that marginally threatened areas are often stripped so that quickly in campaigns to decriminalize "hannIess" behavior police can investigate crimes in areas where the situation (though public drunkenness, street prostitution, and par- is hopeless) or 011 the basis of calls for senice (despite the nographic displays can destroy a comm~nity more quickly fact that most citizens do not call the police when they are than any team of professional burglars), merely frightened or annoyed), To allocate patml wisely. Above all, we must return to our long-abandoned view the department must look at the neighburhoods and de- that the police ought to protect communities as ".ell as in- cide, from first-hand evidence, where an additional officer dividuals. Our crime statistics and victimization surveys will make the greatest difference in promoting a sense of measure individual losses. but they do not measure corn- safety. munallosses. Just as physicians now recognize the impur- One way to stretch limited police resources is being tried tance of fostering health rather than simply treating ill- in some public-housing projects. Tenant organizations hire ness, so the pulice------and the rest of us--ought to recognize off-duty police officers for patrol work in thf'ir buildings. the importance of maintaining, intact, communities with- The costs are not high (at least not per re::<idenU. the offi- out broken windows. := -. . I H l :\ T L ~ '- T I r. \\ 0" T H l..' . __ _,," - . . ,,_ ~._...,t-.:.;~- ~ ~_"IIC.~., -- , ..... -.... Som(tim~ "fixing broktn windows" dots mort fO reduce crime titan COflf.)tnriono/ ";"cidmf-o,.;t1I/td" policing MAKING NEIGHBORHOODS SAFE BY JAMES Q. WILSON AND GEORGE L. KELLING . NEW RRIIIRflELU IIPIIRTME~TS IS ....'" OLD, RL':-.I- Briarficld about their problems. Not surprisingly, he found down collection of wood..: buildings constructed that they were worried about the burglaries-but they in 1942 as temporary housing for shipyard work- were just as concerned about the physical deterioration of ers in Newport News, Virginia. By [he mid-1980s it was the project. Rather than investil!;atinl!; only the burglaries, widely re~arded as the worst housin~ project in the city. Duke spent some of his time investi~ating the buildings, Many of its vacanl un^s provided hiding places for drug Soon he learned that many city agencies-the fire depan- users. It had the highest burglary rate in Newport News; me nt, the public-works departmenl, the housing depart- nearly a quarter of its apartments were broken into at least me nt-regarded New Briarfie\d as a major headache. He once a year. also discovered that its owners were in default on a federal For decades the police had wearily answered calls for as. loan and that foreclosure was imminent. sistance and had investigated crimes in '<ew Briarfield. The report he wrOle to Darrel Stephens. (hen rhe ru1ice J\:ot much came of this police attentiveness-the build- chief, led Stephens to recommend to [he city manaJ!,er that ings wem on deterioratinJ!,. the burJ!,larics went on occur- New Briameld be demolished and its tenants rel<x:ated. , I rinJ!,. the residents went on Iivin~ in terror. Then, in 19M. The city manager agreed. \tfe:mwhilc, Harr" Haddix. the Detective Tony Ouke. assigned [0 a newlv created police patrol officer ass1J!;ned to [he area, began working with task force. decided to imcrview the residents of :-.;c..... members of other ci[" agencies [0 fix up the project. pend- _, ,,Vo..,-..':.:l.ll . ~. -' .--- __~__ ~ - M' ..~", " .-.. -- "T",. 1...' ,," , ., , 'Ii' - :~-, ',: ,~ . ~ -, ~ _ . \., L, ~~ '-' ..l.r::..; (~---:. . ~ ~ .. -'i,.. - ~.. . - . . -: ~ Jr--1 a.:lI "1 -. , ... "\ . ,~, >' .,7 . ~ . . ,- _.~- ~~.. ~.:.~l~ '; : ~wt-~. - ~)i . - i - .. ....i ~ _ . .II.- 0-' II. IllUSTRATIONS BY ROSALIND IVEN'; Fl-:lIlH .\f.lr I~ f THE ^TL....'TIC MO'THL\' jog its eventuaJ replacement. Trash was carted away, aban- from their neighbors. If the back alleys are cleaned up and cloned cars were removed, porholes were filled in, the the abandoned buildings tom down, the drug users will go streets were swept. According to a study recently done by away. They rii,ay even use fewer drugs, because they will John E. Eck and William Spelman, of the Police Execu- have difficulty finding convenient dealers and soft bur- tive Research Forum (PERF), the burglary rate dropped by glary targets. By the same token, a neglected neighbor- 3S pttcent after Duke and Haddix began their work. hood may become the curf of a youth gang, whose mem- Stephens, now the executive direccor of PERF. tells the hers commit more crimes together in a group than they story of the New Briarfield project as an example of "prob- would if they were acting alone. If the gang is broken up, Iem-oriemed policing," a concept developed by Professor fonner members will still commit some crimes but prob- Hennan Goldstein, of the University of Wisconsin Law ably not as many as before. . School, and sometimes also called community-oriented Most crime in most neighborhoods is local: the offend- policing. The conventional police strategy is "incident-ori- ers live near their victims. Because of this, one should not ented" -a citizen ,calls to report an incident, such as a bur- assume that changing the environmental conditions con- glary, and the police respond by'recording information rel- ducive to crime in one area will displace the crime to other evant to the crime and then trying to solve it. Obviously, areas. For example, when the New York City police com- when a crime occurs, the victim is entitled to a rapid, ef- missioner, Ben Ward, ordered Operation Pressure Point, a . crackdown on drug dealing on the Lower East Side, deal- rective police response. But if responding to incidents is all that the police do, the community problems that cause ing and the criminality associated with it were reduced in or explain many of these incidents will never be ad- that neighborhood and apparently did not immediately dressed, and so the incidents will continue and their num- reappear in other, contiguous neighborhoods. Suburban ber will perhaps increase. customers of the local drug dealers were frightened away This will happen for two reasons. One is that a lot of se. by the sight of dozens of police officers on the streets rious crime is adventitious, not the result of inexorable SQ- where these customers had once shopped openly for cial forces or personal failings. A rash of burglaries may oc- drugs. They could not-at least not right away-find an- cur because drug users have found a back alley or an other neighborhood in which to buy drugs as easily as they abandoned building in which to hang out. In their spare once had on the Lower East Side. At the same time, the time. and in order to get money to buy drugs, they steal local population included some people who were willing to ~~ " " '. .:.:=.:..:;:. -:- - :-- If~l '8'_' -'. : -~~ u '.J ~: , :- LLL~ ' q;'.:.:~~ - ~Ii ,.~ :". ~~~i'l ' , *- ~, j' l j~: , ,.." ~ " J, _ .- (:. 1 j.'" ' ~.' ~..,....;.-' ',~ ~ :-;" 'r.J:t .-,1 ,- ~~ \La;.t.,4t1..l't'.:, It.~ ~ . t..~--_ ...__ __..... ~~'.-....-..__ ,- . THE ATLA.STIC MOSTHLY . aid and abet the drug deale~. When the police presence alleviate the fears of the project residents and the gang made drug dealing unattractive, the de.ale~ could oOt- tensions that led to the shooting. COPE officers worked again, at least not for the time being-find another neigh- with members of other agencies to upgrade street lighting borhood that provided an equivalent social infrastructure. in the area, mm shrubbery, install door locks. repair the The second reason that incident-oriented police work roads and alleys, and get money [0 build a playground. fails to discourage neighborhood crime is that law-abiding With police guidance, the tenants organized. At the same citizens who are afraid [0 go out onto streets filled with time, high-visibiliry patrols were started and gang mem- graffiti, winos, and loitering youths yield conuol of these bers were questioned. When both a suspect in the shoot- streets (0 people who are not frightened by these signs of ing and a particularly troublesome parole violator were ar- urban decay. Those not frightened rum out to be the same rested, gang tensions eased. Crime rates dropped. In people who created the problem in the first place. Law- bringing about this change, the police dealt with eJeven abiding citizens, already fearful, see things occurring that different public agencies. make them even more fearful. A vicious cycle begins of . When local merchants in a New York City neighbor- fear-induced behavior increasing the sources of that fear. hood complained to the police about homeless persons A Los Angeles police sergeant put it this way: "When who created a mess on the streets and whose presence people in this district see that a gang has spray-painted its frightened away customers, the officer who responded did initials on all the stop signs, they decide that the gang, not not roUSt the vagra!lts but instead suggested that the mer- the people or the police. concrols the streets. When they chants hire them to clean the screets in front of their stores discover that the Department of Transportation needs every morning. The merchants agreed, and now the three months to replace the StOp signs, they decide that streets arc clean all day and the customers find the stores the ciry isn't as powerful as the gang. These people want more: attractive. us to help them cake back the streetS. " Painting gang sym- . When people in a Los Angeles neighborhood com- bols on a Stop sign or a storefront is not, by itself, a serious plained to the police ;oOout graffiti on walls and gang sym- crime. As an incident, it is trivial. But as the symptom of a bols on scop signs, officers assigned to the Community . problem, it is very serious. Mobilization Project in the Wilshire station did more than just try to catch the gang youths who were wielding the spray cans; they also organized citizens' groups and Boy Scouts to paint over the graffiti as fast as they were put up. . When residents of a Houston neighborhood became fearful about crime in their area, the police not only redou- bled their efforts [0 solve the burglaries and thefts but also assigned some officers to calk with the citizens in their homes. During a nine-month period the officers visited more than a third of all the dwelling units in the area, in- i traduced themselves, asked about any neighborhood prob- IN"" EARLIER ARTICLE IN TIlE A rUNT/C (MARCH. ,..,) lems, and left their business cards. When Antony Pate and we called this the problem of "broken windows": If Mary Ann Wycoff, researchers at the Police Foundation, the first broken window in a building is not repaired, evaluated the project, they found that the people in then people who like breaking windows will assume that this area, unlike others living in a similar area where no no one cares about the building and more windows will be citizen-rontact project occurred, felt that social disorder broken. Soon the building will have no windows. Like- had decreased and that the neighborhood had become wise. when disorderly behavior-say, rude remarks by loi- a better place to live. Moreover. and quite unex. tering youths-is left unchallenged, the signal given is pectedly, the amount of property crime was noticeably that no one cares. The disorder escalates, possibly to seri- reduced. ous crime. These are all examples of community-oriented policing, The sort of police work practiced in Newport News is whose current popularity among police chiefs is as great as an effort to fix the broken windows. Similar projects are the ambiguity of the idea. In a sense, the police have al- under way in cities al\ over America. This pattern consti- ways been community-oriented. Every police officer . tutes the beginnings of the mast significant redefinition of knows that most crimes don't get solved if victims and wit- police work in the past half century. For example: nesses do not cooperate. One way to encourage that coop- . When a gunfight occurred at Garden Village, a low. eration i~ '0 cultivate the good will of both victims and wit- income housing project near Baltimore, the Baltimore nesses. Similarly, police-citizen tensions, over racial County police responded by investigating both the shoot- incidentS or allegations of brutality or hostility, can often ing and the housing project. ChiefComelius Behan direct. be allayed, and sometimes prevented. if police officers stay ed the officers in his Community Oriented Police Enforce- in close touch with community groups. Accordingly, most ment (COPE) unit to find out what could be done to departments have at least one community.relations officer, ---~. I.....~ ................ , THE ATLA.NTIC MONTHLY . who arranges meetings between officers and citizens' hour.;. Research is now under way in Q[her cities to test groups in church basemencs and other neutral locates. this finding. Arrest may prove always [0 be rhe best dispo- But these commonplace features of police work are add- sirion, or we may learn rhar some kind of inrervenrion by a ons, and rarely alrer the rradirional work of mosr parrol of- social agency also helps. Whar is indispurable is thar a do- fieers and detectives: responding to radio calls about spe- mesric fight-like many other events to which the police cific incidents. The focus on incidents works against a respond-is less an "incidcmt" than a problem likely to focus on problems. If Detective Tony Duke had focused have serious, long-term consequences. only on incidents in New Briartleld, he would still be in- Another such problem. familiar ro New Yorkers, is graf- vestigating burglaries in rhat housing project; meanwhile. firi on subway cars. Whar co some aesrheres is folk arc is to the community-relations officer would be relling ourraged most people a sign that an imporcanr public place is no residents that rhe police were doing all they could and urg- longer under public comrol. If graffiti painters can attack ing people co call in any useful leads. If a tenant at one of cars with impunity, rhen muggers may feel they can attack those meetings had complained about stopped-up drains, the people in those cars with equal impuniry. When we rouing Roorboards, and abandoned refrigeracors, the com- first wrote in these pages about the problem of broken muniry-relarions officer would have patiently explained windows, we dwelt on the graffiti problem as an example that these were not "police matters." of a minor crime creating a major crisis. And of course, they are not. They are the responsibility The police seemed powerless to do much about it. of the landlord, the renants themselves, and city agencies They could arresr yourhs with cans of spray paine, bur for other than the police. But landlords are sometimes indif- every one arrested ten more wenc undetected, and of ferent, tenants rarely have rhe resources to make needed those arrested, few were punished. The New York Transit repairs, and other city agencies do not have a twenry-four- Authority, led by its chairman, Robert Kiley, and its presi. hour emergency service. Like jt or not, the police are dent, David Gunn, decided that graffiri-free cars were a about the only city agency that makes house calls around major managemenr goal. New, easier-to-clean cars were the clock. And like ir or not, the public defines broadly bought. More important, key people in the Authority were . what it thinks of as public order, and holds the police re- held accountable for cleaning rhe cars and keeping them sponsible for maintaining order. clean. Whereas in the early 1980s two out of, every three Communiry-orienred policing means changing rhe daily cars were covered wirh graffiri, today fewer than one in six work of the police to include investigaring problems as is. The Transit Police have played rheir part by arresting well as incidents. It means defining as a problem whatever those who paim the cars, but they have been more suc- a significant body of public opinion regards as a threat to cessful at keeping cars from being defaced in the first place communiry order. It meallj working wirh the good guys, rhan they were at chasing people who were spraying al- and nor just against the bad guys. ready defaced ones. The link between incidents and problems can some- times be measuro::d. The police know from experience what research by Glenn Pierce, in Boston, and Lawrence Sherman. in ~finneapolis, has established: fewer rhan 10 percenr of the addresses from which rhe police receive calls account for more than 60 percent of those calls. Many of the calls involve domestic disputes. If each call is creat- ed as a separate incident with neither a history nor a fu- ture, then each dispute will be handled by police officers anxious to pacify the complainants and get back on patrol as q u icklv a~ possible. All too ofren, however, the dispu- tants move beyond shouring insults or throwing crockery WHILE THE 'H"^-SE "CO""'-"TY-ORIEvrED pouc- H each other. :\ knife or a gun may be produced, and ing" comes easily to the lips of police adminiscra- somebody may die. tors; redefining the police mission is more diffi- :\ vefV large proportion of all killings occur in rhese do- cult. To help the police become accustomed to fixing broken mestJC settings. ..\ study of domestic homicides in Kansas windows as well as arresting window-breakers requires do- Cm' showed that In eight out of [en cases rhe police had ing things that are very hard for manv admin istrators to do. hcen called [Q the inCident addres3 at least once before; in Authority over at leasr some patrol officers must be de- . half the cases (hev had been calledfit,t' hmt'S or more. The centralized, so that (hev have a good deal of freedom to pqllce are familiar with thiS pattern. and rhey have learned manage their time (including then paid oveCClmeL This hrJw best (0 respond to It. .-\n experiment in ~finneapolis, implies freeing them at least pan Iv from the tvrannv of the conducted bv the Police Foundation. showed rhat men tadio call. It means giving them a broad range of responsi- who were arrested after assaulting [heir spouses were bilitjes: to find and understand the problems that create much Ins likely to commit new assaults than those who disorder and crime, and to deal with other public and pn- were me rei... pacified or asked to leave the house for a few vare agencies thar can help cope with these problems. It , . THE ATLAr-.:TIL MOSTHU' . me:ms assigning them to a neigtJborhood and leaving them around. Moreover, the best people: are usually kept in the there for an extended period of time. It means backing detective squad that handles the really big cases. Few po- them up with department support and resources. lice executives want their best people settling into a neigh- The reason these are not easy things for police chiefs [0 borhood, walking around the bus StopS and shopping malls. do is not simply that chiefs are slaves to tradition, though The: enthusiasts for community-oriented policing have some impatient advocates of comm unity-<lriented policing answers for all these conc,erns, but sometimes in their zeal like to say so. Consider for a moment how all these they forget that they are contending with more than mere changes might sound to an experienced and intelligent po- bureaucratic foot-dragging-that the problems are real and lice executive who must defend his department against require thoughtful solu cions. Many police executives get media criticisms of officer misconduct, political pressure to in trouble: nor because the crime rate goes up but because cut budgets, and interest-group demands for marc: police cops are accused of graft, brutality, laziness, incivility, or protection everywhere. With decentralized authority, no indifference. one will know precisely how patrol officers spend their In short, police management is driven more by the con- time. Moreover, decentralized authority means that patrol straints on the job than by the goals of the job. You cannot officers will spend time on things like schmoozing with cope with those constraints without understanding them. citizens, instead of on quantifiable tasks like issuing tick- This may be why some of the biggest changes toward com- ets, making arrests. and clearing cases. muniry-oriented policing have occurred in cities where a Making the communi ty-oriented officers generalists new chief has come in from the outside with a mandate to means letting them deal with other city agencies, a responsi- shake up a moribund department. Lee Brown brought a bility for which few officers are well trained and which cuts community orientation to the Houston Police Department across sensitive questions of turf and public expectations. under precisely those circumstances-the reputation of If officers are kft in a neighborhood, some of them may the department was so bad that almost any change would start taking money from the dope dealers and after-hours have been regarded as an improvement. joints. To prevent that, officers are frequently moved What can we say to the worried police chief who is al- .... . SAVING MEMORY Summer nights we put pennies on the ttack. Sing Mickey Mouse, the second scream rising long, again, . up and up. Stick our right hip out, the third Even the station was quiet enough for crickets. Mountains surrounded us, middling high and purple. wailing. Give it a hot-Cha wiggle, the fourth No matter where we stood they protected us surrounding us. And bidding each other fond adieux, with perspective. People call them gentle mountains we'd count to three, turn our backs, flash it a moon, but you can die in there; they're thick and materialize, fantastic, run over with light,- with creeper and laurel. Like voodoo, the train shrieking to pieces, scared, meaning it, I drew pictures with a sparkler. A curved line short, short, short, short, pushing a noise arc ked across the night. Rooted in its slope, bigger than the valley. It sent us flying, one laurel tree big as the mountain holding it. flattened, light as ideas, back on the platform, the Y6B Mallet compound rolling through You can hear the train in the rails. southbound, steambome, out of Roanoke. They're round. not flat, as you'd expect, and slick. We'd walk the sound, one step, twO, It wasn't to make the train jump the track slip, on purpose, in the ballast, hopscotch but to hold the breath-edged piece of copper and waltz on the ties, watching the big round eye grown hot with dying, thin with birth, enter the curve and grow like God out of the purple, wiped smooth of origin and homilies. . the tracks turning mean, molten silver blazing To hold such power. As big as the eye dead at us. We'd hula, Tango. And the first of the train, as big as the moon burning white plume would shoot up screaming long, lonely, like the sun. All the perspective curved and gone. - vain as Mamma shooing starlings from her latticed pies. -Mary SItWt1~ Ha",,,,o,,,1 _ _... ~~. 'r-..lW'"l , filE ATLANTIC: MO~THLY . ready runnin/!; a pretty I?;ood deparemenc? StJre with cor- a professor Jt Michi~:In State Universiry, analyzed the re- ruption; For decades police executives and reformers have suits and found big increases in citizen satisfaction and of- believed that in order to prevent corruption, you have to ficer morale, and even a significant drop in crime (an earl i- centralize comrol over personnel and discourage intimacy er fom-parrol project in Newark had produced equivalent between police officers and citizens. ~laybe. But the price reductions in fear but no reductions in crime). Citizen sup- one pays for this is very hi~h. For example, many neigh- pore was nJt confined to statements made [0 polls ter5 , borhoods are being destroyed by drug dealers, who hang however. Voters in referenda cwice approved tax increases out on every street corner. The best way [0 sweep them off to mainrain the foor-patrol system. the second time by a the streets is to have patrol officers arrest them for selling two-to-one margin. Ne'" Briarfield tenants unquestlon- drugs and incimidate their customers by parking police ably found satisfaction in the role the police played in get- cars right next to suspected drug outlets. But some police ting temporary improvements made on their housing proj- chiefs forbid their patrol officers [0 work drug cases, for ect and getting a commitment for its ultimate replace- fear they will be corrupted. When the citizens in these ment. Indeed, when a department experiments with a cities see police cars d rive past scenes of open drug deal- community-oriented project in one precinct, people in ing, they assume the police have been paid off. Efforts other precincts usually want one too. to prevent corruption have produced the appearance of corruption. Police Commissioner Ben Ward. in New York, decided that the price of this kind of anri-corruption strategy was roo high. His Operation Pressure Point put scores of police officers on the streets to break up the drug-dealing bazaar. Police corruption is no laughing marrer, especially in New York, but some chiefs now believe that it will have to be fought in ways that do not require police officers co avoid . contact with people. Consider the problem of gerring police resources and managing political pressures: resources can be justified POLITICIANS, LIKE POLICE CHIEFS, HEiAR THESE VIEWS with statistics. but statistics often become ends in them- and respond. But they hear other views as well. One selves. One police captain we interviewed said that his de- widespread political mandate is to keep the taX rate partment was preoccupied with "stacking widgets and down. Many police departments arc already stretched thin counting beans." He ask~ his superior for permission (0 by sharp reductions in spending that occurred in the lean rake officers out of radio cars and have them work on com- years of the 19705. Putting o1le additional patrol car on the muniry problems. The superior agreed but warned that he streets around the clock can cost a quarter of a million dol- would be watching to see what happened to "the stars." In lars or more a year. the short run the stats-for example, calls answered, aver- Change may seem easier when resources are abundant. age response time-were likelv to get worse, but if com- Ben Ward could start Operation Pressure Point because he muniry problems were solved, they would get better as had at his disposal a large number of new officers who citizens had fewer incidents to report. The capuin wor- could be thrown into a crackdown on street-level drug ried, however, that he would not be given enough time to dealing. Things look a bit different in Los Angeles, where achieve this and thar the bean counters would cut off his no big increases in per50nnel are on the horizon. As a re- program. suit, only eight officers are assigned to the problem-solving A better Way to justify getting resources from the city is Communiry Mobiliz.ation Project in the Wilshire district- to stimulate popular demand for resources devoted to an economically and ethnically diverse area of nearly problem-solving. ProperlY handled, community-oriemed 300,000 residents. policing does generate support for the department. When But change docs not necessarily require more resources, :\"ewark police officers, under orders from Hubert Wil- and the availability of new resources is no guarantee that Iiams. then the police director. began stopptng city buses change will be attempted. One temptation is to ttv to sell and boarding them to enforce cit\" ordinances against the public on the need for more policemen and decide lat- smokmg, dnnkmg, gambling. and pla\'lOg loud music. the er how to use them. Csuallv when that script is followed. . .bus patrons often applauded. When Los .-\nge 1c:s police of- either the public rums down the spending increase or [he ficers supervised the hauling away of abandoned cars. extra personnel are dumped into what one LAPD captain onlookers JpplJuded. LJter. '.\ hen some of rhe officers calls rhe "black hole" of existing commitments. leavlOg no had rhelf rime .1\ ailable for problem-solving work cur trace and producing no effects. back. se\ eral hU'ldred CI[lzcns attended a meeting to \\'hat mav have :in effect is how the police arc deployed complain. Jnd man:iged. .-\n experiment jointly conducted bv the In Flior. \lichlgJn, pJrrol otTicers \\ere raken OUt of \\"ashington. D.C.. Police Department and the Police:' rheir cars Jnd Jsslgned (() foor beJts. Robert TrojJno\\ icz. Foundatlon showed that If a few experienced officers con- . I THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY ! . centrate on known repeat offenders, the number of serious nizations suIted in the most troubled neighborhoods was I offenders t2ken off the streets grows substantially. The very difficult. The COSts and benefits of having patrol offi- I Flint and Newark experiences suggest thu foot patrols in cers and sergeants influence the delivery of services from cernin kinds of communities (but not all) can reduce fear. other city agencies has never been fully assessed. No way In Houston problem-oriented tactics seem clearly to have of wresting control of a neighborhood from a street gang heightened a sense of citizen security. has yet beetl proved effective. The problem of interagency cooperation may, in the And eve~ if these questidns are answered, a police de- long run, be the moS( difficult of all. The police can bring partmenr may still have difficulry accommodating two very problems to the attemion of other city agencies, but rhe different working cultures: the patrol officers and detec- systcm is not always olganized ro respond. In his book tives who handle major crimes (murders, rapes, and rob. Neig/llJorltood Sn"fMc. John Mudd calls it the "rat prob- beries) and the cops who work on community problems lem": "If a rat is found in an apartment, it is a housing in- and the seemingly minor incidents they generate. In every spection responsibility; if it runs inco a restaurant, the department we visited, some of the incidenr-oriented offi- health departmcnt has jurisdiction; if it goes outside and cers spoke disparagingly of the problem-oriented officers dies in an alley, public works rakes over." A police officer as "sociaJ workers," and some of the laner responded by who takes public complaints about rats seriously will go calling the former "ghetto blasters." If a communiry-ser- crazy trying to figure Out what agency in the city has re- vice officer seems to get too close to the community, he or sponsibiliry for rat control and then inducing it to kill the she may be accused of "going native." The tension be- rars. tween the two cultures is heightened by the fact that in Matters are almoSt as bad if the public is complaining many departments becoming a detective is regarded as a about abandoned houses or school-age children who are major promotion, and detectives are often selected from not in school. The housing department may prefer [0 con- among those officers w~o have the best record in making centrate on enforcing the housing code rather than go major arrests-in other words, from the ranks of the inci- through the cosdy and time-consuming process of getting dent-oriented. But this pattern need nor be permanent. . an abandoned house rom down. The school department Promotion tracks can be changed so that a patrol officer, may have expelled the truant children for making life mis- especially one working-on community problems, is no crable for the teachers and the other students; the last longer regarded as somebody who "hasn't made detec- thing it wants is for the police to tell the school to take the tive." Moreover, some police executives now believe that kids b2ck. splitting the patrol force into cwo units--one oriented to An city and couney agencies have their own priorities incidents, the other to problems-is unwise. They are and face thcir own pressures. Forcing them to cooperate searching for ways to give all patrol officers the rime and by knocking heads togetHer at the tOp rarely works; what resources for problem-solving activities. department heads promise the mayor rhey will do may Because of rhe gaps in our knowledge about both the re- hear little relationship to what their rank-and-file employ- suits and the difficulries of communiry-oriented policing, ees actually do. From his experiences in New York City no chief should be urged to accept, uncritically, the com- government Mudd discovered that if you want agencies to munity-oriented model. But the traditional model of po- cooperate in solving neighborhood problems, you have to lice professionalism-devoting resources to quick radio- get the neighborhood-level supervisors from each agency car response to calls about specific crime incidenrs- together in a "district cabinet" that meets regularly and ad- makes little sense at a time when the principal threats to dresses common concerns. This is nor an easy task (for one public order and safety come from colkctivt, not individual, thing, police districr lines often do not match the district sources, and from probkms, not incidents: from well-orga- boundaries of the school, housing, traffic, and public- nized gangs and drug traffickers, from uncared-for legions works departments), but where it has been tried it has of the homeless, from boisterous teenagers taking advan- made solving the "rat problem" a lot easier. For example, rage of their newfound freedom and affluence in congest- Mudd reports, such interagency issues as park safety and ed urban settings. refuse. laden vacant locs gOt handled more effectively Even if community-oriented policing does not produce when the field supervisors met to talk about them than the dramatic gains thar some of its more ardent advocates when memos went up rhe chain of command of one agen- expect, it has indisputably produced one that the officers cy and then down the chain of command of another. who have been involved in it immediately acknowledge: it . has changed their perceptions of the community. Officer Robin Kirk, of the Houston Police Department, had to be C OM Mt.::-.Jn-v ORGANIZATIONS ALO:-.'G THE LINES OF [;lIked intO becoming part of a neighborhood fear-reduc- Neighborhood Watch programs may help reduce tion projecL Once in it, he was converted. In his words, crime. but we cannot be certain. In particular, we "Traditionally, police officers after about three years get to do not know whar kinds of communities are most likely to thinking that everybody's a loser. That's the only people benefir from such programs. A Police Foundation study in you're dealing with_ In community policing you're dealing Minneapolis found that getting effective community orga- with the good citizens, helping them solve problems. " 0 ..-