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04-29-03 Charter Commission Regular MeetingCITY OF HOPKINS CHARTER COMMISSION AGENDA April 29, 2003 6:30 p.m. Conference Room 227 1. Call to Order 2. Roll Call 3. Election of Chair and Co -Chair 4. Approval of the Minutes of the Previous Meeting 5. Reports 6. Consideration of Communications 7. Old Business 8. New Business • Discussion of Alternative Voting Systems 9. Adjournment ATTACHMENTS: • Minutes of the February 12, 2002 Charter Commission meeting. • Presentation on Alternative Voting Systems • "FairVote Minnesota promotes new way to vote" Sun Newspapers CHARTER COMMISSION April 29, 2003 Name Term Term Expires Sid Blair First 10/20/2005 Dorothy Boen First 4/13/2004 John Frane First 6/10/2004 Roger Gross First 4/13/2004 Marjorie Hance Second 9/26/2004 Fran Hesch First 4/7/2006 John Hutchison First 10/20/2005 Roger Johnson First 8/26/2005 Charles Kritzler Second 9/26/2004 ,--",James Shirley Second 10/8/2004 Chair: Charles Kritzler Vice -Chair: Dorothy Boen Minutes of the Hopkins Charter Commission February 12, 2002 The Hopkins Charter Commission met on February 12. Present were Commission members: Sid Blair, Dorothy Boen, John Franc, Marjorie Hance, John Hutchison, Chuck Kritzler, Henry Pokorny and Hairy Smith. Assistant City Manager Jim Genellie was also present. The meeting was brought to order at 6:30 p.m. Approval of the Minutes of the Previous Meeting. Commissioner Blair moved and Commissioner Smith seconded a motion to approve the minutes of Febiliary 5, 2002. The Commission voted unanimously to approve the minutes. Reports. There were no official reports. Communications There were no communications. Old Business Establishment of the Police Review Committee Commissioner Smith moved and Commissioner Franc seconded the motion to approve Resolution 2002-01 recommending that the City Council adopt Ordinance 2002-867 amending the Charter to add a Police Review Conunittee. Commissioner Blair requested that the City Council be informed that several commissioners preferred simply abolishing the Civil Service Commission. Commissioner Hance had a question concerning the hiring procedures in the Police Department. Were there any requirements for the procedures used to hire employees other than those outlined in the Civil Service Commission rules? Mr. Genellie provided a copy of a section of the Minnesota Rules that mandated procedures for the hiring of police officers. After some further discussion, the question was called. A poll of the vote was as follows: Commissioner Blair, Nay; Commissioner Boen, Aye; Commissioner Franc, Aye; Commissioner Hance, Aye; Commissioner Hutchison, Nay; Commissioner Kritzler, Aye; Commissioner Pokorny, Aye; and Commissioner Smith, Aye. The motion passed. Removing the Requirement that an Ordinance becomes effective twenty days after publication. Commissioner Smith moved and Commissioner Boen seconded the motion to approve Resolution 2002-02 recommending that the City Council adopt Ordinance 2002-869 amending the Charter to eliminate the twenty -day waiting period after an ordinance is published for it to become effective. - 1 - Commissioner Hutchison argued that there should be a period of time between the date an ordinance is published and when it takes effect. Mr. Genellie responded that there were often times when the delay was unnecessary. He used the example of the Pawnshop ordinance. This ordinance only affects one business and that business was consulted during the process of creating the ordinance. A waiting period for the purpose of the licensee to become aware of the ordinance is not necessary. He also explained that the City Council would retain the ability to set any effective date they wished on any ordinance. For example, if the City Council adopts an ordinance limiting the number of vehicles that a household can have parked outside, the Council may want to have a waiting period greater than twenty days before the ordinance becomes effective. After some ftirther discussion, the question was called. A poll of the vote was as follows: Commissioner Blair, Nay; Commissioner Boen, Aye; Commissioner Frane, Aye; Commissioner Hance, Aye; Commissioner Hutchison, Nay; Commissioner Kritzler, Aye; Commissioner Pokorny, Aye; and Commissioner Smith, Aye. The motion passed. The Commission set its next meeting for April 29, 2003 at 6:30 p.m. New Business There was no new business. Adjournment. Prior to adjournment it was announced that Commissioners Pokorny and Smith were completing their second terns on the Commission. They were thanked for their participation. Commissioner Smith moved and Commissioner Hutchison seconded the motion to adjourn. The meeting adjourned by imanimous consent. !WM cmrvot I1,`i S0T.A� Making Every Vote Count Vision for better democracy —Broaden representation —Strengthen accountability —Deepen discourse —Increase participation What's wrong with the winner -take -all system? P►Tilemma: conscience v. lesser of two evils PwNo riaht to representation -"No choice" elections ,,-,Majori rule? .-Accountable to whom? z-Voters' rational apathy Alternative Voting Systems Making Democracy Work Even Better Defmitions voting system: rules that determine how voters vote and how winners are chosen winner take all: voting system where voters vote for as many candidates as can be elected; those with the most votes win, all others lose Majority rule? With increasing frequency, "winners" receive less than majority of the votes 2-,Clinton 45 40 35 30 25 20% ❑ 1992 15 % Pn•�Wenttul 10 % ulecunn 5% 0% a' G � � 1 Majority rule? With increasing ao i frequency, 3u "winners" receive 25 r zoi less than majority tsi of the votes to i si 2?► Clinton o R r ,;-i o ►'Ventura , G r w Accountable to whom? Presence of special interest money raises doubt that public interest is being served Two -round elections — Longer campaigns with greater cost for campaigns and election administration —Greater opportunity for negative campaigning in second election — Reducing large field to two candidates in one step may be too abrupt —Reduced participation in choosing the. winners Zero sum game (I win, you lose - or vice versa ) Intense partisan bickering at expense of public's business Voters' rational alnathy Fewer and fewer bother to vote Can you blame them? The Solution: Preference Voting —Allows as many voters as possible to win representation — Is more competitive, strengthening accountability — Provides for more substantive discussion of issues —Eliminates need for two elections and gives each vote greater effect, increasing participation 2 Democracy in Sweden 2-Issue-oriented campaigns zwMeaningful choices for voters -,High voter turnout zwWomen elected in large numbers -Stable governments, prosperous economy Instant Run-off Voting for executive offices P- Goal: assure majority rule ❑ Bob Lund v-,Voters rank candidates in order ❑ Jan Fritz of choice zVCount first choices ❑ Willie Brown cast for each candidate ❑ Rosa Santos Instant Run-off Voting for executive offices ,Candidate with fewest first choice votes is eliminated — those votes go to candidates listed as second choice on each ballot Lund Fritz Brown SVtos 14 11 9 6 +3 +2 +1 17 13 10 What are the alternatives and why are they better? zwInstant Run-off Voting for executive offices a -Proportional (or "Full") Representation for legislative bodies Instant Run-off Voting for executive offices -Candidate with fewest first choice votes is eliminated Lund Fritz Brown Santos 14 11 9 6 Instant Run-off Voting for executive offices -Process continues until one candidate wins with majority of votes Lund Fritz Bb4%,n S'Jkos 14 11 9 6 +3 +2 +1 17 13 10 +2 +8 19 21 Advantages of Instant Run-off Voting 2-Assures majority rule zwProvides greater choice for voters ,,-Promotes better campaigns ,—Eliminates "conscience v. lesser -of -two - evils" dilennna How can I learn more about alternative election systems? Call on FairVote FairVote Minnesota Minnesota as a resource PO Box 19440 . speakers bureau Minneapolis MN 55419 . study circles tel 612-724-5540 . public policy infood FairVoteMN.org . information resources wvvw.FairVoteMN.org . technical assistance What can you do about alternative voting systems? aw Stay connected. Sign up with FairVote Minnesota to keep abreast of the issues zw Study, on your own and with others, the impact of voting systems on effectiveness of democracy w Start using alternative voting systems in your own organizations - Seek endorsement of alternative voting systems for public elections by organizations of which you are a member ATot m -NI 1 N. S 01 A — Education — Public Poliev — Election services wuu.FairVotcMN.ore M FairVote Minnesota promotes new way to vote By James Proescholdt Sun Newspapers . (Created 3/27/03 8:37:00 AM) Elections have always left some voters feeling disgruntled. FairVote Minnesota, a nonprofit and nonpartisan organization, is advocating a new form of tallying votes that would attempt to reduce these problems, making every vote count. In a presentation on March 19 in Hopkins, Tony Anderson Solgard, chairman of FairVote Minnesota, said several problems arise out of the voting system now in place, what he called the "first past the post" system. According to Solgard, in this system, only the largest group wins representation in an election. The candidate that gets past the "post" first wins the position, no matter if that candidate has the support of a majority of registered voters or not. "Everyone else loses, even if everyone else is the majority of the voters," he said. For this reason, the system is sometimes referred to as "winner takes all." Solgard, who was also a past member of the Minnesota DFL Party State Executive Committee, said that too often, seats go to candidates without the majority's approval. He said that for the top individual positions in the state of Minnesota, 10 of the last 11 election winners won with less than a majority vote. He said the most prominent of these victors was Jesse Ventura, who won with only 35 percent of voters voting for him. Solgard said that in the "first past the post" system, candidates often resort to desperate campaign tactics to win. He said that negative campaigns often target swing voters, the voters who are undecided. He said this tactic cheapens discourse. "Who are they speaking to? They're not speaking to you and me, the people who are engaged," said Solgard. He said that across a population, the group of voters with the largest number of votes get their officials elected. The remainder of the population does not receive any sort of representation, even though it may make up the majority of voters. Solgard said that elections that use wards for residents to vote usually succumb to the same pitfall. Though wards promote geographic diversity, they still allow the largest group to win. "Trends in the population tend to be distributed throughout the population," he explained. He said that in his hometown of Minneapolis, 60 percent of voters are DFL-affiliated, but all the City Council positions are held by DFL-affiliated candidates. Two -round elections also have their share of problems, said Solgard. With a primary and a final election, the process is longer and more costly. Also, reducing a large field of candidates to two in one step may be too abrupt. Solgard pointed to the election in France last year where the vote was split among so many factions, that voters were surprised to find a "neo-fascist," Jean-Marie Le Pen, one of the elected candidates. Solgard also said that two -round elections practically encourage the final candidates to sling mud. He said that the candidates try to "make the other guy look muddier. You've just got mud on your hands. They've got mud all over." Preference voting The solution to these problems, said Solgard, is preference voting. Under this . process, voters select which candidates they would like to win, and in what order. Instead of voting for a single candidate or a group of candidates, each voter forms a list of candidates ranked in the order of preference. The new process would require candidates to achieve a majority of votes. This factor significantly changes the tallying of votes. Say, for example, that three candidates run for a single seat and none immediately receives the majority of the votes. The candidate who received the lowest number of votes would be removed from the race, and all the votes that person received would instead be added to the respective second choices on the ballots. Solgard said that in many instances, the candidate that at first seemed the victor would come in second place. The preference voting process would eliminate the "wasted vote syndrome," according to Solgard. Even if voters' first choices do not win, their votes would go to their second choices. Hopkins resident Fran Hesch, who organized the event, said that this system would have helped her in the 2000 election. She wanted to vote for third -party candidate Ralph Nader, but wasn't sure if she should have voted for Al Gore instead. In the end she voted her heart and decided on Nader. "Some people would say I threw my vote away, but a system like this would allow you to have your cake and eat it too," she said. Solgard said that the benefits under preference voting would be numerous. He said that it would broaden representation, strengthen accountability, deepen discourse on issues and increase participation. "There's no such thing as a wasted vote here," he said. 2 Rep. Jim Rhodes, R-44A, attended the meeting and said that politicians need to ` consider preference voting. "This issue needs to be brought to the table," he said. "We can't just dismiss it." He suggested testing the system in a small pilot election. Solgard said that the Minnesota Senate is already debating a bill that would implement preference voting in some instances. The bill, Senate File Number 629, is authored by Sen. Linda Scheid, DFL-Brooklyn Park. According to Solgard, the sole disadvantage to preference voting would be the cost. New machines to tabulate the votes might be expensive. However, he said that the state of Minnesota has some funds earmarked to buy new voting equipment in the near future. He hopes to persuade state officials to consider preference voting when purchasing the equipment. Solgard advocated testing the preference voting system slowly at first. He suggested that small elections begin piloting instant runoff voting, a preference voting process for electing candidates to single -seat positions, like mayors or presidents. He said that after elections have used this procedure, then cities could hold elections for races with multiple positions, like city councils or school boards. Solgard said that implementing preference voting into mainstream elections would take time. "It's an incremental change," he said. Information: www.fairvotemn.org 3 Instant Runoff Voting — a primer What is Instant Runoff Voting? IRV is a ranked ballot method of voting that results in a winner chosen by a majority of the voters. The voters rank the candidates in order of preference. Each voter has one vote which counts for the highest preferred candidate that can use it. The term "Instant Runoff Voting" was coined because the method of transferring votes from defeated candidates to continuing candidates is just like a runoff election except that it is accomplished on one ballot. It is also known as Single Transferable Vote (single winner version), Alternative Vote, and Majority Preferential Vote. Rank the candidates order of pyour o imur runoffchoices 1st 2nd 3rd ( choice choice choice 1 John ❑ ❑ ❑ Bill! El ❑ ❑ _ Frank Wi ❑ ❑ 0 First choices are counted. If no candidate receives a majority, the candidate with the fewest votes is defeated, and those votes are transferred to the next ranked candidate on each ballot. The votes are recounted. The process continues until one candidate has a majority of the votes and is declared the winner. 1st u Choices I John i 35 1 Instant I Final Runoff 1 Results 1 +16 1551 Winner! Bill 20 i -20 1 Frank 1 45 ! +4 l 49 Total 100 I 1 Winning I l 51 :Threshold; � Instant Runoff Example John Bill Frank John Bill Frank 0 Design by David Ray Carson. devidrayearson.wm i Instant Runoff Voting — a primer Majority rule is a fundamental principle of democracy. However, in recent years, winners of elections frequently have been chosen by less than a majority of voters. In the last three presidential elections, the winner received less than a majority of the popular vote. In Minnesota in 1998, not a single state-wide constitutional officer was elected with a majority of the vote. Most notably, Jesse Ventura was elected with 37 percent of the vote, the second lowest winning percentage in state history. In 2000, both statewide races (for President and for U.S. Senate) and three U.S. Representatives were elected with less than a majority of the vote. In 2002, with four major parties competing, four of the five statewide elections were decided by less than a majority, and the principle of majority rule was once again not confirmed. Instant Runoff Voting would assure that the principle of majority rule is upheld in Minnesota elections. When a majority of voters divides itself between two candidates, the larger party may decry the presence of the smaller party as spoiling the election and causing unrepresentative results by electing a third candidate who did not receive majority backing. The smaller party is aggrieved by the distraction of the voting system's effects and the lost opportunity to campaign on its issues. Caught in the middle are many voters who are conflicted over how to cast an effective vote. The "spoiler problem" would be eliminated by Instant Runoff Voting. With IRV, smaller parties can campaign on their issues. Larger parties' opportunities will not be lost due to peculiar system effects. Voters can vote their conscience without fear of not having a voice in the final outcome. IRV results in a more positive campaign and better information for voters because candidates have an incentive to appeal to their rivals' supporters to be their 2nd choices. Candidates will be less likely to distort the differences with a rival and will be more likely to say how they are similar to a rival. 1. A runoff election is expensive and logistically difficult to administer. 2. Voter turnout drops significantly in the second election, calling into question whether meaningful majority rule has actually been achieved. 3. A longer campaign season increases the cost of campaigning, a consequence at odds with current sentiment about the need for campaign finance reform. 4. Cutting the field to two candidates may be too abrupt, as the majority might prefer a candidate eliminated in the first round (The 2002 French presidential election is an example of how this might happen. See httD://www.fairvoteinn.ora/articles/archives/majority 05012002.html for more information.) 5. After the field is cut to two candidates, negative campaigning is more likely. With IRV, a larger pool of voters can participate in choosing the winner. It is a more sure method of discovering the wishes of the majority. IRV promotes a positive campaign and eliminates a costly and unnecessary second election. FA Instant Runoff Voting — a primer Does IRV require sty tl t? No. Cities with home rule charters can adopt IRV by incorporating it in their charter. State and federal elections could be conducted by IRV simply by changing state law. How do we t IRV in Minnesota? There are three sensible immediate steps to move toward using IRV in Minnesota: Electronic voting equipment should be upgraded to process a ranked ballot. All new voting equipment purchased or certified for purchase should have the flexibility to process a variety of ballot types, including ranked ballots as well as the more familiar `vote for one' or `vote for up to x' ballots. 2. Public education is needed to understand why a change is needed and what the benefits are of the IRV alternative. That should include a state -commissioned blue ribbon panel to study our voting system and compare it to alternative systems. An excellent example is a bipartisan study done by the University of Illinois Institute on Government and Public Affairs. See http://www.igpa.uillinois.edu/publications/specPubs/index.html#electoralSystems. 3. Local government adoption of Instant Runoff Voting could serve as a laboratory for the rest of the state to observe and learn from. Some have questioned whether home rule cities have the authority to do this without state authorization. FairVote Minnesota has researched the legal basis for home rule cities to adopt IRV. The findings have been published in the October 2002 issue of Bench & Bar of Minnesota. APPENDIX. A COMPARISON OF SELECTED ELECTORAL SYSTEMS The principal purpose of this section is to propose and evaluate four electoral systems, including the current plurality system, that conceivably could be used to elect members to the Illinois House of Representatives. The discussion is divided into three parts: (1) an enumeration of nine criteria to evaluate electoral systems; (2) a summary of the four electoral systems; and (3) an evaluation of the systems using the nine criteria, PROPOSED CRITERIA FOR JUDGING AN ELECTORAL SYSTEM We all have an idea or two about what makes for a good electoral system. A Republican might prefer majority voting, for example, because he or she knows that most people in the state are Republicans. Or independents might favor proportional representation because it helps minor parties win legislative seats. A truly systematic evaluation, however, requires an explicit, inclusive, and exhaustive list of general criteria that can be applied to any electoral system of interest. Scholars and practitioners have spent considerable time setting forth such criteria. Building on past efforts, the task force concluded that the following nine criteria should be used to evaluate an electoral system: 1. Does it encourage citizen participation in the electoral process? 2. Does it encourage competition and offer citizens a real choice in the selection of legislative representatives? 3. Does it simplify the voting task and enhance voter understanding of that task? 4. Does it ensure that the partisan division of elected legislators closely resembles the overall pattern of partisan votes in the electorate? 5. Does it provide fair regional representation in the legislature? 6. Does it provide significant racial, ethnic, and gender representation in the legislature? 7. Does it enhance the accountability of legislators to their constituents? 8. Does it foster decisiveness in the legislative process? 9. Does it encourage cooperation and the effective participation of all legislators? We take the first three criteria —encourages citizen participation, offers citizens a real choice, and simplifies the voting task —to be uncontestable. Any electoral system that fails to meet these three criteria does not serve its citizens well. Debate is morelikely to center on the remaining criteria. This is not because any particular criterion is undesirable —most students of electoral systems endorse them all —but because meeting one criterion often conflicts with meeting another. For example, ensuring that the partisan division of elected legislators closely resembles the partisan vote (criterion 4) is not likely to be compatible with ensuring significant racial, ethnic, and gender representation in the legislature (criterion 6) . An electoral system designed to maximize the representation of women, Executive Summary. Report on Political Representation and Alternarive Electoral Systems ■ 29 Hispanics, and African -Americans almost never will produce a legislature that accurately represents the partisan split in the vote. Similarly, encouraging decisiveness in the legislative process (criterion 8) likely will conflict with encouraging the effective participation of all legislators (criterion 9). Most political disagreements about the choice of electoral systems are over one or both of two issues. We just discussed the first; which of the conflicting criteria are more important. The second —how well a particular system meets the criteria —will become evident when we try to apply the nine criteria to several systems. We will do that shortly. First, however, we need to identify the systems and then briefly discuss them. FOUR ELECTORAL SYSTEMS Single -Member District Plurality Voting Single -member district plurality voting (SMD) is the system most commonly used for legislative elections in the United States. Also known as "first -past -the -post," SMD is the system currently used to elect state legislators to the Illinois House and Senate. All of the candidates appear on the ballot —the list typically is winnowed to two, one from each of the two dominant parties, via primary elections —and each voter votes for one of them. The winner is the candidate with the most votes, whether or not that candidate's votes are a majority of the total. Two of the most often cited advantages of this system are its simplicity and its low administrative costs. It is also seen as a system that promotes close ties between legislator and constituency, in that the districts are relatively small and constituents know whom to contact in time of need. It promotes a two-party system because third -party candidates rarely win. Critics are quick to note that SMD wastes all the votes cast for the losing candidate(s) and denies representation to third parties. It also encourages gerrymandering, which in turn leads to a decline in competitive districts, often to the extent that there is only a single candidate from which to choose. Instant Run -Off Voting A variation of plurality voting is instant run-off voting (IRV) . Just as in plurality voting, all candidates are listed on the ballot. But instead of voting for only one candidate, voters rank the candidates in order of their preference (" 1" for first choice, " 2 " for second, etc.). The counting is also different from plurality voting. A computer scans and tabulates the ballots. First, all the number one preferences of the voters are counted. If a candidate receives over 50 percent of the first choice votes, he or she is declared elected. If no candidate receives a majority of the first -place votes, the candidate with the fewest votes is eliminated. The ballots of supporters of this candidate are then transferred to whichever of the remaining candidates was marked as the number -two choice. The vote is then recounted to see if any one candidate now receives a majority. This process continues until one candidate receives a majority of the vote, which consists of his or her first -place votes plus the needed number of continuing votes. Advocates of IRV believe that it has two notable advantages over first -past -the -post voting. First, the winning candidate will have the meaningful support of a majority of the voters, which increases his or her legitimacy. Second, IRV ensures that an independent or a third -party candidate will not play spoiler and throw the election to the one of the two 30 major -party candidates who in fact was not the electorate's overall first choice. On the other hand, IRV is more administratively complex. Closely related, summing the continuing votes to identify a winning candidate can lead to perverse outcomes when many voters do not identify second and third choices. Cumulative Voting Cumulative voting (CV) was used to elect members to the Illinois House until 1982. In the United States, CV is the most talked about form of semi -proportional representation. It currently is not used in any country outside the United States; and within the United States, it is used at the local level. The cumulative voting system retains the plurality, first -past -the -post part of SMD. Candidates run in multi -member districts. Voters have as many votes as there are seats. Voters cast their votes for individual candidates and the winners are the ones with the most votes. The major difference from SMD systems is that voters can "cumulate" or combine their votes, instead of just having to cast one vote for one candidate. In other words, voters can distribute their votes among candidates in any way they prefer. Proponents of CV see it as an especially effective way to ensure minority party representation. Many also believe that it can increase the chances for racial and ethnic minorities to win representation and thus see it as the best alternative to race- and ethnic - conscious districting. Cumulative voting also discourages gerrymandering, or at least makes if more difficult. On the other hand, a large number of candidates, especially in the primary election, can overwhelm citizens' ability to make rational choices. Critics of cumulative voting as it existed in Illinois argue that party control over candidate selection was much greater than met the eye. They also contend that the actual act of voting was too complicated for many voters. Party -List Voting Party -list Voting (PLV) is a form of proportional voting, which is the main rival to plurality -majority voting. Among advanced Western democracies, proportional representation (PR) has become the predominant system. In Western Europe, for example, 21 of the 28 countries use PR. These include Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. PR operates on a simple principle: the number of seats a political party or group wins should be in proportion to the legislature support it garnered among voters. So, if a political party (or group) wins 30 percent of the vote, it should receive 30 percent of the seats. Under PLV systems, legislators are elected in large, multi -member districts. Each party puts up a list or slate of candidates equal to the number of seats in the district. Independent candidates can also run, and they are listed separately on the ballot as if they were their own party. On the ballot, voters indicate their preference for a particular party and the parties then receive seats in proportion to their share of the vote. So, in a five -member district, if the Democrats win 40 percent of the vote, they would win two of five seats. The two winning Democratic candidates would be chosen according to their position on the list. There are two broad types of list systems: closed list and open list. In a closed list system, the party fixes the order in which candidates are listed and elected, and the voter simply casts a vote for the party as a whole. That is, winning candidates are selected in the exact Executive Summary. Report on Political Representation and Alternative Electoral Systems ■ 31 order that the parties put them on the list. Most European democracies now use the open list form of party voting. This approach allows voters to express a preference for particular candidates, not just parties. It is designed to give voters some say over the order of the list and thus which candidates get elected. Voters are presented with unordered or random lists of candidates chosen in party primaries. Voters cannot vote for a party directly, but must cast a vote for an individual candidate. This vote counts for the specific candidate as well as for the party. So the order of the final list used to choose legislators completely depends on the number of votes won by each candidate on the list. For example, if the Democrats win two of five seats, and Joe and Mary receive the most Democratic votes, Joe and Mary are elected. PLV and proportional representation (PR) systems more generally tend to be friendlier than other systems to minority parties. They also waste fewer votes and afford better representation of racial, ethnic, and gender minorities. The districts tend to be more competitive, and representation of diverse interests in the legislature is relatively good. PR systems also reduce gerrymandering and encourage greater discussion of issues in campaigns. On the other hand, PR systems can foster unstable legislative coalitions and legislative gridlock. Some critics feel that, in a multi -party system (which PR encourages), small parties have too much power and get too many concessions. If the multi -member districts become too large, it weakens constituency -legislator relationships. Closed lists encourage parties to select diverse candidates, while open lists give more power to voters. Open lists also can become highly complicated and can intensify intra-party rivalries, since candidates often end up campaigning against other candidates of the same party. A Hypothetical Example To see how different electoral systems can lead to different outcomes, consider two types of district. In the first, the district is split 70-30 between X and Y, where X and Y can stand for Democrat and Republican, white and non -white, men and women, etc. Under both plurality and instant run-off voting, the X candidate wins. Under cumulative and party list voting, there will be more winning X than winning Y candidates, but both types will be elected to the legislature. The difference in the cumulative and party listing voting outcomes will depend on the extent to which the candidates included in the party list differ from those who would run on their own. Next consider a very different district: one that is split 34, 33, and 33 percent among three interests. Designate these interests, respectively, as X, Y, and Z. Under plurality voting, the X candidate wins. Under instant run-off, in contrast, any of the three candidates can win, depending on how voters' second preferences are configured across the three candidates. Whereas the plurality and instant run-off voting systems led to similar outcomes in the first example, they do not here. Under cumulative and party list voting, at least one candidate X will be elected to office. How the other two seats will be allocated (assuming there are three in total) under cumulative voting is not clear. Under party list voting, it is almost certain that one X, one Y, and one Z candidate will be elected to office. Not everyone will agree on the most desirable system. No one can deny, however, that the choice of an electoral system has considerable consequences for the way that citizens' votes are translated into legislative seats. 32 AN EVALUATION OF THE FOUR ELECTORAL SYSTEMS We have delineated nine criteria and briefly summarized four electoral systems. How, then, do the four systems stand up vis-a-vis the criteria? To answer this question, we have done the following. For each criterion, we have placed the four systems along a 10-point scale, ranging from very poor to very good. Thus, on any given criterion, one can quickly compare the performance of the four systems. Two notes of caution are in order. First, not everyone will agree with our conclusions. Indeed, our principal purpose is to encourage discussion of the systems vis-a-vis the criteria, not to impose our own conclusions. Second, any evaluation requires simplifying what is in reality a very complex political phenomenon. The consequences of different electoral systems depend on a host of factors: how the population is distributed, who controls the financing of campaigns (which itself can depend on the type of electoral system that is being used), and what factors citizens consider most important (party versus racial and ethnic identification, for example). With these caveats duly noted, our evaluations appear in the box on the next page. Following is a brief discussion of our rationale for the alignment of systems on each of the nine criteria. Criteria 1 and 2: Encourages Citizen Participation and Offers Citizens a Real Choice Plurality and instant -run-off voting fare poorly on these two criteria because both systems encourage gerrymandering, which in turn reduces competition and thus voting turnout. In contrast, cumulative and party -list -voting systems typically afford citizens meaningful choices and thus do better at encouraging citizens to vote. Criterion 3: Simplifies the Voting Task Plurality voting systems excel in meeting this criterion. Typically, at least in general elections, voters are asked to choose between two candidates who run on the two major - party labels. All three of the other systems, in contrast, require the voter to make more complicated choices. Sometimes the task before the voter can be formidable and lead to confusion. Criterion 4: Ensures Accurate Translation of Partisan Votes into Legislative Seats Plurality voting does relatively poorly on this criterion because all of the votes in a district that go to other than the winning candidate are wasted. Instant run-off voting performs better because voters' second and third preferences are taken into account if no candidate receives a majority of the votes on the first ballot. Cumulative and party list voting are designed to provide a fairly accurate translation of the partisan vote shares into shares of the legislative seats. Executive Summary, Report on Political Representation and Alternative Electoral Systems ■ 33 Criterion 5: Provides Fair Regional Representation in the Legislature Illinois historically has divided into three political regions: Cook County, the surrounding collar counties, and downstate. None of the systems would be extremely poor at representing all three regions. However, cumulative and party -list voting do better at ensuring that all regions receive majority and minority party representation in the legislature. Both also do better at ensuring the representation of various groups across all three regions. Criterion 6: Provides Signillcant Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Representation. Any form of proportional or semi -proportional representation (party -list and cumulative voting, respectively) potentially will achieve this goal more fully than plurality and majority systems will. Indeed, the goal of group representation is usually the rallying cry for implementation of the former systems. Criterion 7. Enhances Accountability of Legislators to Constituents Plurality voting fares poorly on this criterion because it affords parties the opportunity to carve out legislative districts in a way that reduces if not eliminates competition. Cumulative and party -list voting strengthen the accountability of representatives to certain parts of the constituency. Criterion 8: Fosters Decisiveness in the Legislative Process Relative to plurality voting, cumulative and party -list voting weaken decisive legislative decision -making. Under the most extreme of circumstances, when party list voting leads to a fragmented party system, minor party legislators can stall and sometimes stop legislative policymaking. Criterion 9: Encourages Effective Participation of All Legislators Cumulative voting is an especially effective vehicle by which to ensure that all legislators effectively participate in the policy process. At the other extreme, plurality voting and single -member districts increase the opportunities for leaders to gain power over the rank - and -file. 34 SMD, Single -Member District Plurality Voting IRV, Instant Run -Off Voting CV, Cumulative Voting PLV, Party -List Voting VERY VERY POOR GOOD CRITERION 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 S 9 10 Encourages Citizen Participation SMD IRV CV PLV Offers Citizens a Real Choice SMD IRV CV PLV Simplifies the Voting Task CV PLV IRV SMD Ensures Accurate Translation of Partisan Votes into Legislative Seats SMD IRV CV PLV Provides Fair Regional Representation in Legislature SMD IRV CV PLV Provides Significant Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Representation SMD IRV CV PLV Enhances Accountability of Legislators to Constituents SMD IRV CV PLV Fosters Decisiveness in Legislative Process PLV CV IRV SMD Encourages Effective Participation of All Legislators SMD IRV PLV CV Executive Summary. Report on Political Representation and Alternative Electoral S,vswnis e h